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 At No Serious Risk?  
Border Control and Asylum Policy  
in Britain, 1994-2004 
 
 
Will Jennings 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In the post-9/11 era, the British government’s formulation and administration of 
policy relating to immigration controls is increasingly organized around the notion 
of ‘risk’, and mobilized through the state’s technologies of inspection and 
measurement (see Scott 1998). This paper considers colonization of asylum policy 
in Britain, between 1994 and 2004, by the concepts of risk and risk management. It 
then modifies the thermostatic model of policy-opinion responsiveness (see 
Wlezien 1995, 1996,  2004) for empirical analysis of the interactions of policy, 
bureaucracy and public opinion in the control and administration of asylum by the 
Home Office in Britain, over the period between 1994 and 2004. This paper draws 
upon methods of time series regression and intervention analysis to estimate 
responses of specified policy outputs to (i) changes in public opinion and (ii) 
interventions by government. These enable discussion of the co-existence of 
responsiveness and risk in this particular policy domain. 
 
 
 1
Introduction 
 
In Britain, no other domestic topic has become as increasingly controversial since 
election of the Blair Government on 1 May 1997 than immigration policy. The 
events of 11 September 2001 transformed population movement and border 
protection into visibly public risk and control problems. Of course, already 
underlying trends of social and economic globalization preceded this seismic event, 
shaping the set of policy dilemmas that today confront legislators and bureaucrats. 
However, risk is a concept that is colonizing the contemporary formulation and 
administration of immigration controls and asylum policy in Britain. This is a 
symptom of a number of intersecting trends observed in development of the modern 
state and its apparatus of government. In Seeing like a state, Scott (1998: 88) details 
the state’s ‘aspiration to the administrative ordering of nature and society’. It is a 
creature of inspection and control, where power is mobilized through technologies 
of monitoring and measurement. This might also be considered a cause or 
consequence of the increasing Trust in numbers (Porter 1995). At the same time, 
emergence of a modern, professional bureaucracy – with its staffing of the technical 
and scientific apparatus of an ‘administrative state’ (Skowronek 1982; Skocpol 
1992; Carpenter 2001) in the United States or ‘regulatory state’ (Majone 1994) in 
Western Europe – is interconnected with an increasing organizational focus upon 
the control of threats, uncertainties and hazards. The growth of the reach and 
expertise of the state leviathan through periodic crises (Higgs 1987) is juxtaposed 
with more incremental reforms of administrative practice. Therefore, the 
contemporary state of affairs in immigration policy and controls might be 
considered a punctuated equilibrium in historical evolution of cross-border controls. 
Indeed, the modern paradigm, British historian A.J.P. Taylor (1965) recounts, dates 
to August 1914 and the war in Europe. That disturbed the status quo of an absence 
of state monitoring and control and of freedom of movement for each ‘sensible, 
law-abiding Englishman’. In order to understand the colonization of asylum policy 
and management in Britain by the concept of risk, it is helpful to model the 
interactions of state and society as a time dependent process.  
 
 
Responsiveness and risk in asylum policy 
 
The responsiveness of government to the preferences of its citizens is considered by 
many to be an important indicator of the performance of advanced democracy (Dahl 
1971). Some go so far as to claim that ‘responsiveness is what democracy is 
supposed to be about’ (Verba and Nie 1972: 300). The open interplay of policy and 
public opinion is, at least, an important characteristic of any democratic system of 
government (Lasswell 1941). More recently, Geer (1996) has argued that the 
availability of opinion research to modern government provides it with the 
opportunity to respond to public opinion with strategic and considered precision. 
Yet, replications of earlier studies of representation in the United States (Monroe 
1979, 1998; Page and Shapiro 1983; Jacobs and Shapiro 1979) observe declines in 
the responsiveness of government to its citizens. This theoretical perspective is far 
removed from Beck’s narrative of the risk society (1992) – a society that is 
increasingly organized in response to risks rather than public opinion. 
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The juxtaposition of risk and responsiveness provides insight into a defining 
dilemma of contemporary government – that is, of tension between technical 
uncertainty, political interventions and public opinion. Despite longstanding 
foundations of asylum policy in international law – and its relation to questions of 
border control – there is evidence that, in the past decade, the concepts of risk and 
risk management have permeated the British Government’s interventions in border 
protection and the administration of claims for asylum. The 1951 UN Convention 
defines a refugee as someone who  
 
... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’ (1951, Article 1A). 
 
This original definition is noticeably premised upon certainty (where applications 
are ‘well-founded’) and it is only recently that uncertainty has become an 
organizing concept in administration of asylum. 
 
Under the Treasury’s 2002 Spending Review, a principal objective of the Home 
Office for 2003-2006 is stated as to ‘… regulate entry to and settlement in the 
United Kingdom effectively in the interests of sustainable growth and social 
inclusion’.1 Over time, the deportation of failed asylum seekers has – increasingly – 
been guided by the concept of ‘risk’. The 1996 Act, provided power to the 
Secretary of State to prescribe countries or territories in which there was ‘in general 
no serious risk of persecution’ (Section 1, c. 49). This ‘white list’ of third countries 
eased the administrative burden upon the Home Office, and provided legitimization 
to the blanket removal of particular groups. Suspension of the list in 1999 proved 
temporary and was reintroduced in 2002. The 1996 Act prevented in-country 
appeals for applicants who had travelled to Britain via a ‘safe third country’ 
(specified as within the European Union, United States, Canada, Switzerland or 
Norway). In addition, the process of ‘non-suspensive appeals’ established by the 
2002 Act removed in-country right of appeals for applications certified as being 
‘clearly unfounded’ by the Secretary of State for designated third countries where 
the applicant was considered ‘at no serious risk of persecution’. 
 
The contagion of risk-based policy and administration has since spread to visa 
regimes for visitors to the United Kingdom. On 15 October 2003, the Home Office 
announced that with the tightening of visa regimes designed to heighten border 
controls, exemptions would ‘… be made for certain categories of transit passengers 
with a low level of immigration risk’.2 The increased usage of transit visa regimes 
to deflect, and deter, unfounded asylum claims has been mobilized around 
classification of ‘high risk’ visitors to the United Kingdom. It is therefore evident 
that ideas of security, safety, threat, hazard and risk were pervasive in development 
of British asylum policy throughout the past decade. There is – at the same time – 
an increasing reliance upon technological solutions as instruments of societal 
control and measurement, in response to risk. The government White Paper of July 
1998, Fairer, faster and firmer, claims ‘greater operational flexibility is essential in 
                                                 
1 HM Treasury. 2002. Spending review, Public service agreements 2003-2006, Objective 6. 
2 Home Office. 15 October 2003. Press Release, ‘Tighter visa regimes to improve border control’. 
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modern immigration control. Resources must be able to be deployed rapidly to 
areas of greater risk’.3 In this, reforms of immigration controls are premised upon 
the routinization and concentration of administrative activities in areas of highest 
risk. These are dependent upon the technologies of immigration control – which can 
be categorized as detection, identity verification or information management 
systems. For instance, search/detection technologies deployed at domestic and 
foreign ports include carbon dioxide detectors (CO2 wands), x-ray scanners, 
automatic number plate readers (ANPRs), and closed circuit television (CCTV). 
There is also a European dimension to control activities in coordination of shared 
systems (e.g. the Eurodac fingerprint database introduced in 2003) and juxtaposed 
border controls (implemented at Eurostar terminals at Paris Nord, Lille, Calais, 
Boulogne and Dunkirk in France and Belgium’s Gare du Midi in Brussels). The 
expansion of the risk management capabilities of the state coincides with the 
practical blurring of international borders. 
 
 
The public thermostat and policy responsiveness 
 
At the same time, it is possible to understand policy systems or sub-systems as 
instruments of control and responsiveness. This constitutes ‘regulatory’ government 
in its broadest sense. It is argued that the public’s preference for policy in a specific 
domain is relative (Wlezien 1995, 1996, 2004). The ideal point for public 
preferences (Rt) is equal to difference between the preferred level (P*t) and actual 
level (Pt) of policy. 
 
Rt = P*t – Pt        (1)  
 
If there is responsiveness (β) in a specific policy domain, change in policy (Pt) will 
be positively correlated with change in the public’s relative preference for policy, 
ceteris paribus, allowing for effects (γ) of indirect representation through elections 
(Zt). That is to say, shifts in public opinion are likely to be followed by shifts in 
policy. This is said to be a ‘thermostatic’ model because the public adjusts its 
preference in response to the actual level of policy. For some, ‘policy’ consists of 
expenditure (Wlezien 1995, 1996, 2004), legislative attention to particular topics 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993), legislative behaviour (Stimson et al. 1995; Erikson 
et al. 2002) or statements of legislative intent (Hobolt and Klemmemsen 2005).  
 
∆Pt =  a0 + βRt-1 + γZt-1 + et      (2) 
 
There is already a wealth of research that models policy systems and sub-systems as 
systems of control (see Moe 1982, 1985, 1987; Wood 1988; Wood and Waterman 
1991, 1993, 1994; Scholz and Wood 1998). Therefore, policy can be conceived as a 
function of the strategic interventions of government (It) and empirical ‘noise’ (Nt) 
that is diagnosed for a given policy domain.  
 
Pt = f(It) + Nt        (3) 
 
                                                 
3 Cm 4018. July 1998, Fairer, faster and firmer - A modern approach to immigration and asylum. London: 
TSO. 
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This implies a more discrete, punctuated relationship between the actions of 
government and actual bureaucratic or policy outputs. It also promotes integration 
of methods of time series regression and intervention analysis.  
 
 
Border protection and asylum in Britain, 1994-2004 
 
In the analysis that follows, the reciprocity of the policy-opinion connection is 
modelled with a thermostatic model (Wlezien 1995, 1996, 2004) specified for 
asylum policy, with ‘issue importance’ as its measure of public opinion. This 
estimates the results for a series of time series regression models and reports 
findings on the thermostatic responsiveness of outputs for this domain, intersected 
by the colonization of risk-based policy. To investigate the rhythm of 
responsiveness, models of best fit are estimated for monthly, quarterly and half 
yearly intervals (conducting preliminary tests for lags between 1 and 36 months). 
Following this, time series intervention analysis is performed to estimate effects of 
specific legislative and bureaucratic events on policy outputs. The impact of the 
interventions is discussed in relation to concepts of risk and risk management – and 
the state’s predilection for the administrative ordering of nature and society. This 
specific methodology has not previously been used in analysis of government 
performance in Britain. 
 
 
Policy outputs 
 
The operation of border controls and administration of different forms of 
immigration is consistent with the conceptualisation of the supply of ‘more’ or 
‘less’ bureaucratic or policy outputs. But what does the actual quantity of outputs 
(Pt) consist of? There are a number of different routes of entry into Britain. While 
the existing system is complex and incoherent, the principal routes of immigration 
are via the work permit system, family settlement system, a number of work-related 
schemes, student visas and the asylum system. The official statistics published by 
the Home Office report the general level of immigration (with information of levels 
in select sub-categories), but record the level of asylum as a distinct entity. This 
provides considerable detail on performance of the asylum system. The structure of 
administration for asylum is itself ‘thermostatic’ in nature. The level of inputs into 
the system is a function of the interaction of border controls with an exogenous 
level of potential applications. The level of system through-flow is dependent upon 
the processing of applications. In order to be granted asylum an applicant must have 
‘a well-founded fear of persecution’ – as defined by the 1951 Geneva Convention 
on Human Rights. The dispensation of leave to remain constitutes short-term 
protection, where special considerations are required or where removal is precluded 
by the European Convention on Human Rights. If these different criteria are not 
met, applications are refused. The sum of initial decisions constitutes the level of 
quasi-outputs of the asylum system. However, where applications have been 
refused there is a right of appeal, to regulate the accuracy and reliability of 
decisions. The level of actual outputs of the system consists of removals of failed 
applicants.4
                                                 
4 On a case-by-case basis, the determination of applications for asylum is a zero-sum game. If an application is 
granted, it cannot be simultaneously refused or granted leave to remain. However, applications are not 
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 (1) Applications 
 (2) Decisions [includes (3), (4) and (5)] 
 (3) Grants  
 (4) Leave to remain [‘short-term protection’]5
 (5) Refusals 
 (6) Appeals 
 (7) Removals  
 
This study uses monthly data on asylum and immigration provided exclusively for 
research purposes by the Asylum Statistics Team of the Immigration Research and 
Statistics Service at the Home Office6 and the Migration Statistics Unit at the Office 
for National Statistics. 7  It estimates the thermostatic responsiveness of these 
specific benchmarks of asylum and immigration policy, as these represent the most 
complete time series data available for this domain. This does not include 
temporary categories created by government. The empirical data on appeals against 
asylum decisions is only available in quarterly format since 1997. This is excluded 
from analysis. 
 
 
Results 
 
Factor analysis (see Table 1) of the various output items for immigration policy 
indicates that these exhibit a significant amount of common variance. This is as we 
should expect in theory for the various components of asylum policy, since the 
level of applications is reflected in the subsequent level of decisions and each of the 
different sub-categories (refusals, grants, leave to remain, detentions, appeals, 
removals). There is least commonality with the level of removals – and this is also 
as we should expect, since it is furthest removed in the system from the level of 
applications. That is to say that it is subject to most bureaucratic slippage or 
shirking. On average, an increase in the number of entrants causes an increase in 
grants and refusals of asylum. Noticeably, the level of immigration (adjusted for 
seasonal variation through calculation of a 12-month moving average) is distinct 
from the components of asylum policy, although it nonetheless appears that these 
policy items move together over time in the same direction. 
                                                                                                                                        
necessarily processed in the same order as they are submitted, nor should it be assumed that this order is 
random. For example, fast-track facilities at the Oakington detention centre were used to determine cases that 
were ‘manifestly unfounded’, selected via the initial screening interview on the basis of country of origin. 
5 The category of ‘extraordinary leave to remain’ was replaced in April 2003 by categories of ‘humanitarian 
protection’ (HP) and ‘discretionary leave’ (DL).  
6 Asylum Statistics Team, Immigration Research and Statistics Service (IRSS). Asylum applications received in 
the United Kingdom, excluding dependants, and initial decisions on applications 1994-2004. Statistics for 1999 
are completed with provisional data from the Home Office’s monthly statistical bulletin, Asylum statistics: 
February 2000, United Kingdom. Statistics for 2004 are completed using the Home Office’s annual statistical 
bulletin, Asylum statistics United Kingdom 2004. 
7 Migration Statistics Unit, Office for National Statistics. International migration, estimates from International 
Passenger Survey, 1994-2003. Note that this data is for research purposes only. The IPS survey’s sampling 
frame is designed for quarterly estimates, so these months do not represent a balanced sample. The IPS 
definition of a migrant is someone who intends to stay for at least a year in the UK. These do not include 
estimates for asylum seekers, visitor switchers, migrant switchers or migrants to and from the Irish Republic. 
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Table 1. Factor loadings of immigration policy items 
 
 Factor 
Items 1 2 3
Asylum 
 Applications 0.67 -0.08 0.37
 Decisions 0.99 0.05 -0.15
 Grants 0.72 -0.44 0.17
Leave to 
remain 
0.84 -0.11 -0.01
 Refusals 0.89 0.27 -0.33
 Removals 0.36 0.41 0.18
Immigration 0.09 0.43 0.29
Eigenvalue 3.58 0.64 0.41
Proportion of 
variance 
0.79 0.14 0.09
 
 
The public thermostat 
 
It is not unreasonable to suggest that the public possess a relative preference for 
immigration (Wlezien 1995, 1996, 2004). That is to say it desires ‘more’ or ‘less’ of 
it, depending upon its actual level. From time to time, research omnibuses such as 
the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) ask the British public about its relative 
preference for more or less immigration (with the topic included in relation to the 
settlement of particular ethnic/national groups in 1983, 1984, 1986, 1989, 1990, 
1994, 1995 and 1996). Between 1995 and 2003, the proportion of survey 
respondents who believed that the number of immigrants to Britain should be 
‘reduced a lot’ increased from 39% to 49%. However, continuous time series data 
on this or other similar attitudinal scales simply does not exist. Instead, the most 
regularly surveyed measure of public attitudes relating to immigration, for the 
period from 1994 to 2004, is the monthly MORI Political Monitor.8 This asks, 
‘What would you say is the most important issue facing Britain today?’ in addition 
to ‘What do you see as other important issues facing Britain today?’. Since 1974, 
this captures responses about the relative importance of issues of ‘race relations / 
immigration / immigrants’. It also includes responses that refer to asylum. 9  
Significantly, answers are unprompted and data is collected for a wider selection of 
issue categories that are relatively stable over time. This is however an imperfect 
substitute for the public’s inclination for more or less immigration. At the micro-
                                                 
8 MORI. Political Monitor, 1974-2005. See http://www.mori.com/polls/trends/issues.shtml. 
9 See Duffy et al. (2003: 23), The more things change …Government, the economy and public services since the 
1970s.  
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level, surveys detect low levels of public knowledge about the state of the asylum 
system and a disproportionate assessment of perceived risk(s). There exists 
systematic public overestimation of the proportion of immigrants entering the 
country (Duffy et al. 2003). In addition, perceived and actual risks co-exist and 
perhaps interact with this preference for more or less. These include cultural, social 
and economic versions of risk (for example, threats associated with terrorism, 
public health, national or civic identity, community integration, public services and 
crime).   
 
Many studies use the ‘most-important-problem’ question surveyed by Gallup as an 
indicator of public policy preferences (McCombs and Shaw 1972; MacKuen and 
Coombs 1981; Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). 
That is not without problem (Wlezien 2005). There is a significant distinction 
between the importance of an issue, its importance relative to other issues, and its 
salience; not to mention the extent to which it is considered an ‘issue’ or a 
‘problem’ by the public. The level of immigration may consistently be an important 
issue for the public, but vary in its importance relative to other issues. Moreover, 
even if immigration is perceived as an issue, this is not necessarily the same as it 
being considered a problem. For this study, the use of survey data on issue 
importance is, therefore, subject to a qualification. It is quite possible that this does 
not correspond to the public’s underlying preference for more or less immigration. 
However, it is adopted as a crude indicator of the prevailing public mood regarding 
the level of immigration. This – at least – reveals changes in the relative intensity of 
public opinion.  It is conceivable that issue importance represents either a relative 
preference for ‘more’ or ‘less’ immigration or its relative importance.  
 
 
Results 
 
Do the public respond to change in policy outputs related to the control and 
administration of asylum and immigration? By estimation of a set of time series 
regression models, it is concluded that actual policy outputs for asylum control and 
administration have a positive and statistically significant effect on public opinion. 
In contrast, the public’s responsiveness to immigration is – perplexingly – negative, 
although statistically significant at only the 90% level. This suggests the public 
thermostat is sensitive to changes in outputs of the asylum system, but is perversely 
responsive to changes in outputs for the immigration system. The results 
summarized in Table 2 show that increases in the level of asylum applications, 
decisions, grants, leave to remain and refusals are each correlated with increases in 
issue importance, whereas increases in the level of removals are correlated with 
decreases in issue importance. In other words, if the number of entrants into – and 
through – the asylum system increases, so does public concern. It is helpful here to 
outline the practical implications of some of the coefficient values that are reported 
in Table 3. For instance, the coefficient 0.00128 for Pt-11 indicates that for every 
1,000 additional asylum applications per quarter, issue importance increases by 
1.28%, at a lag of 11 quarters. The value of lags for immigration is perhaps 
misleading because this series is transformed as a 12-month moving average. It 
captures change between the first and thirteenth months of the series so a lag of one 
quarter is, in practice, a lag of five quarters from the starting point of the moving 
average. 
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Table 2.  Public responsiveness regressions, differenced10
 
Independent 
variables 
Dependent variable: change in public opinion (Rt-n) 
 Asylum Immigration 
 Applications  Decisions Grants Leave to 
remain 
Refusals Removals  
Change in 
Independent 
Variable (Pt-2) 
– 
 
0.00030** 
(0.00010) 
0.00253*** 
(0.00050) 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
Change in 
Independent 
Variable (Pt-5) 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
0.00287*** 
(0.0004) 
0.00587** 
(0.00020) 
– 
 
- 0.00065* 
(0.00029) 
Change in 
Independent 
Variable (Pt-11) 
0.00128**  
(0.00053) 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
Change in 
Independent 
Variable (Pt-23) 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
- 0.0219*** 
(0.0060) 
– 
 
Constant (a0) 0.20  
(0.97) 
0.79 
(1.21) 
0.97 
(0.96) 
0.53 
(0.59) 
0.41 
(0.79) 
0.36 
(0.45) 
1.49 
(0.92) 
Interval / 
observations 
Quarterly /  
32 
Half 
Yearly /  
19 
Half Yearly 
/ 19 
Quarterly / 
38 
Quarterly 
/ 38 
Monthly / 
96 
Quarterly / 
38 
Degrees of 
freedom 
31 18 18 37 37 95 37 
R2 0.16 0.36 0.60 0.55 0.20 0.12 0.12 
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.33 0.57 0.53 0.18 0.11 0.10 
Durbin-Watson 2.70 2.41 2.50 2.63 2.66 2.44 2.59 
Note: OLS regression coefficients, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests) with standard 
errors in parentheses. These models of best fit are estimated from tests of lags between 1 and 36 
months, and are selected according to principal criteria of the maximum value of Adjusted R2. 
 
 
Because this tests the responsiveness of an individual measure of public opinion to 
a series of outputs of asylum and immigration policy it is particularly significant 
that the statistical fit of models estimated for asylum grants and leave to remain 
capture more of the variance in this empirical data (with values of adjusted R2 equal 
to 0.57 and 0.53 respectively). This makes a lot of sense too since, on average, we 
would expect that more applications should translate into more decisions – 
consisting of grants of asylum and leave to remain. Therefore, the public’s response 
to the number of asylum grants entails some existing information about the number 
of applications in an earlier period (and likewise about the number of decisions in 
the present time period). It is conceivable that the public’s responsiveness to actual 
outputs is additive through successive stages of the asylum system.  
                                                 
10 The public opinion series includes values for three missing observations that are generated by linear 
ipolation. For the quarterly, half yearly and yearly versions of the series, missing values are replaced by an 
ipolation of the original monthly series; with each observation taken from the final month of the quarterly, half 
yearly or yearly interval. There is missing data for removals between January and December 1994.  
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The public response is thermostatic for asylum because if the level of system inputs 
increases there is a corresponding increase in issue importance, and if the level of 
system inputs decreases there is a corresponding decrease in issue importance. 
Therefore, the intensity of public opinion about asylum policy – as is conceived 
here – does appear to change in a consistent and predictable way. Indeed, it reflects 
the actual level of policy outputs. This is evidently premised upon the prevailing 
attitude that accommodation of immigrants entering through the asylum system is 
undesirable. This is not perfectly thermostatic, however, since the estimated models 
provide only a partial prediction of change in public opinion (with the values of 
adjusted R2 up to 0.57). That is to say that there are exogenous sources of public 
opinion, unrelated to the actual level of asylum. In summary, the results imply that 
the British public do notice and respond to the control and administration of asylum 
at the aggregate level. That the public is insensitive to changes in the level of 
normal immigration is, moreover, consistent with an apparent fixation of sectors of 
media, political and public opinion with asylum claimants. Nonetheless, it remains 
conceivable that adjustments in issue importance coincide with a stable, underlying 
public preference for the level of immigration. If that is the case, issue salience is 
thermostatic even if relative preferences are not. 
 
 
Policy responsiveness 
 
It should be evident that border control and asylum provide an outstanding example 
of a thermostatic model of bureaucratic and policy outputs. In theory, the British 
Government has power to respond to pressure from public opinion at different 
points in the asylum system. It might target entrants (i.e. applications), accelerate 
the rate of processing (i.e. decisions), manipulate the existing standard for 
determinations (i.e. grants, leave to remain and refusals), or toughen up 
enforcement (i.e. removals). Of course, changes at specific points in the system 
might only displace problems elsewhere (e.g. an increase in the level of refusals 
creates a backlog of cases for removal).  
 
To repeat, if there is ‘responsiveness’ in a specific domain, changes in policy 
outputs (Pt) are positively correlated with changes in public opinion from a previous 
time period (Rt-1). In practice, this model is transposable to a number of different 
immigration outputs, such as those considered here – asylum applications, 
decisions, grants, leave to remain, refusals or removals, and entry clearance for the 
other forms of immigration. Finally, the effect of partisanship on policy 
responsiveness (γZt-1) is captured in the estimation of this model by a dichotomous 
variable. It is equal to 0 if government is formed by the Conservative Party and is 
equal to 1 if government is formed by the Labour Party. This measures the effect of 
indirect representation on responsiveness of border control and asylum to public 
opinion. 
 
 
Results 
 
But do changes in public opinion translate into actual changes in policy outputs? 
The models of best fit reported in Table 3 indicate that the responsiveness of actual 
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outputs is highest for series measured at quarterly or half yearly intervals. It is 
concluded that public opinion has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
the measured outputs for asylum – and a positive, but statistically insignificant 
effect on outputs for other forms of immigration. Specifically, these results show 
that increases in issue importance lead to decreases in asylum applications, grants 
and leave to remain, and to increases in decisions, refusals and removals. This is as 
should be expected. In order to reduce the number of entrants to, and through, the 
asylum system, policymakers and bureaucrats act to interdict claims, reduce grants 
of asylum and leave to remain, and increase refusals and removals. The 
responsiveness of decisions and grants of asylum is not significant at the 90% 
confidence level. That is unsurprising since, in theory at least, grants are subject to 
autonomous, independent criteria (i.e. the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees 
and European Convention on Human Rights). Because earlier results showed that 
the public thermostat was not responsive to change in the level of other forms of 
immigration, corresponding unresponsiveness of actual outputs – positive and not 
significant at the 90% confidence level – is consistent with our expectations. 
 
Once again, it is helpful to demonstrate practical implications of the values of the 
coefficients that are reported in Table 3. The coefficient -551.08 for Rt-2 indicates 
that, on average, a 1% increase in public opinion leads to a reduction of 551 in the 
level of asylum applications, at a lag of one year. In the estimated models of best 
fit, the value of the dummy variables for government are not significant, but might 
be interpreted as implying that increased levels of asylum and immigration entry are 
observed under a Labour Government (if the high standard errors are disregarded). 
Because this analysis only covers the period between 1994 and 2004 – and is, 
therefore, limited to only three and a half years of Conservative Government – it is 
dangerous to infer a causal relationship between change in the level of policy 
outputs and the party in government. Similarly, because estimated models provide 
only a partial explanation of variation in the empirical data, it appears that there are 
exogenous determinants of policy outcomes.   
 
To review, there are clear and meaningful differences in the opinion-responsiveness 
of outputs for the government’s management of asylum. The distinctive pattern of 
responsiveness between individual sub-categories of control and administration 
suggests sophisticated and systematic behaviour of both legislators and bureaucrats. 
It is significant that the level of removals of failed applicants from the system is 
best explained by changes in public opinion, followed by the interpretative and 
discretionary category of decisions – leave to remain. That contrasts with the 
unresponsiveness of grants of asylum. This implies that certain parts of the asylum 
system are more predisposed or open to responsiveness than others. If bureaucratic 
action is subject to clearly defined and external criteria, there is less scope for 
responsiveness. Where subject to discretion (i.e. leave to remain and refusals) or 
enforcement (i.e. removals) there is more scope for responsiveness. Of course, that 
structure of policy responsiveness is confined to the evidence presented for this 
case. To conclude, border controls and the administration of asylum by the British 
Government is positively responsive to adjustments in public opinion. When the  
public wants more, it gets more. In contrast, there is not an equivalent relationship 
between the general level of immigration and public opinion.  
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Table 3.  Policy representation regressions, differenced 
 
Independent 
variables 
Dependent variable: change in policy (Pt) 
 Asylum Immigration 
 Applications Decisions Grants Leave to 
Remain 
Refusals Removals Entry 
Clearance 
Change in Public 
Opinion (Rt-1) 
– – 10.31 
(6.26) 
- 
260.25** 
(94.91) 
– – – 
Change in Public 
Opinion (Rt-2) 
- 551.08*  
(223.80) 
– – – – – – 
Change in Public 
Opinion (Rt-3) 
– 370.66* 
(168.56) 
– – 258.89* 
(119.10) 
41.52** 
(15.28) 
– 
Change in Public 
Opinion (Rt-5) 
– – – – – – 501.56 
(255.40) 
Party in 
Government (Zt-
1) 
1396.14 
 (3129.94) 
- 742.02 
(2000.86) 
- 7.99 
(55.05) 
484.45  
(1247.97) 
- 638.19 
(1413.75) 
- 226.02 
(232.19) 
5288.33 
(4672.65) 
Constant (a0) - 388.78  
(2668.17) 
371.57 
(1726.30) 
4.24 
(46.04) 
- 8.29 
(1036.30) 
370.39 
(1219.76) 
369.62 
(203.66) 
1840.11 
(4371.79) 
Interval  
/ Observations 
Half Yearly  
/ 19  
Quarterly 
/ 40 
Monthly 
/ 130 
Half 
Yearly 
/ 20 
Quarterly 
/ 40 
Half 
Yearly 
 / 18 
Half Yearly 
/ 16 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
18 39 129 19 39 17 15 
R2 0.28 0.12 0.14 0.31 0.11 0.34 0.29 
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.07 0.04 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.18 
Durbin-Watson 1.79 2.29 1.68 2.25 2.03 2.36 1.14 
Note: OLS regression coefficients, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests) with standard 
errors in parentheses. These models of best fit are estimated from tests of lags between 1 and 36 
months, and are selected according to principal criteria of the maximum value of Adjusted R2. 
 
 
Policy interventions and risk in asylum policy 
 
How did the British Government control, and prioritize, the designated activities of 
the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) between 1994 and 2004? How 
did this relate to the concepts of risk, risk assessment and risk management? Studies 
use the method of time series intervention analysis (Box and Tiao 1975) for post 
hoc estimation of the effect of discrete interventions on a time series in the presence 
of a dependent noise structure. The general form of the Box-Tiao model implies 
that, in theory, a dependent series (Pt) consists of a transfer function (It) and noise 
component (Nt). In other words, it permits analysis to differentiate between 
deterministic and stochastic variations in a series. This is a recognized technique for 
testing the effect of policy interventions on levels of bureaucratic activity (Moe 
1982; Bendor and Moe 1985, 1986; Wood 1988, 1991; Wood and Waterman 1991), 
unused in analysis of British Government. In order to detect the properties of the 
 12
noise component, analysis estimates an ARIMA model (Box and Jenkins 1970) to 
describe underlying stochastic trends or processes in the empirical data. The Box-
Jenkins method is atheoretical in nature, since it does not consider causal 
relationships that generate stochastic variation. Instead, it performs a series of 
autocorrelation diagnostics to construct a model with autoregressive, integrated and 
moving average components of order p, d, q. This provides the stochastic 
benchmark against which to estimate the effect of interventions on the dependent 
series. The proposition of distinct categories of interventions enables the 
specification of a series of transfer functions (1It-n, 2It-n … NIt-n) and estimation of 
their impact upon bureaucratic or policy outputs (Pt). The transfer function is 
represented as a binary variable (1,0). It specifies each intervention as a ‘step’ 
[permanent] or ‘pulse’ [temporary] input.11 In this analysis, permanent effects of 
interventions are tested with step inputs. The dynamic response of the dependent 
output to interventions is, likewise, subject to different forms. For a detailed formal 
exposition of the model, see Box and Tiao (1975) or Hibbs (1977). It is, therefore, 
possible to express a model of dynamic responses of the level of asylum 
applications, decisions, grants, leave to remain, refusals and removals to specified 
interventions in the form:  
 
Pt = ωo1It-n + ωo2It-n + … ωoNIt-n +      at       + µ   (4)
                  (1 – φ1B)  
 
Where ωo is the weighting of each intervention at a lag of n months, at is white 
noise disturbances, φ1 is an autoregressive noise parameter, B is the backshift 
operator such that P`t = BPt-1 and µ is the mean. The results reported in Tables 5 and 
6 exclude interventions that did not provoke a response from the dependent series; 
as the Box-Tiao technique is premised upon the systematic and iterative 
specification of a model that is parsimonious, yet consistent with a defined theory 
of causation. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Similar to ambiguities associated with ‘near-integrated’ data (DeBoef and Granato 1997), it is conceivable 
that the limited duration of a time series might cause a pulse input to appear to be a step input. 
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Results 
 
In order to construct a time series intervention model it is necessary to first 
postulate a causal theory of the effect of discrete interventions (It) on bureaucratic 
and policy outputs (Pt). The general categories of intervention that are considered in 
this analysis are derived from studies of bureaucratic control; adapted for the 
archetypical strategies, styles or configurations of policy intervention that – in 
theory – characterise the Westminster system. It is contended that the legislative 
and executive interventions listed below represent forms of political control and, 
therefore, potential sources of change in levels of bureaucratic activity.  
 
(1) popular election and formation of Cabinet government,  
(2) primary legislation in the form of acts of parliament,  
(3) secondary legislation in the form of statutory instruments,  
(4) appointments of  
(i)  ministers by the Prime Minister, or  
(ii) senior civil servants by the Civil Service Commissioners,  
(5) imposition of performance targets or incentives, 
(6) budgetary appropriations, supply or expenditure, 
(7) alteration of administrative systems, rules, procedures or technologies,  
and  
(8) legislative or [independent] statutory oversight.  
 
This study first compiled a comprehensive index of dates of known interventions; 
acts of parliament, statutory instruments (such as changes in the ‘Immigration 
Rules’) political appointment of Secretary of State for the Home Department and 
public appointments of the Permanent Secretary of the Home Office and Director-
General of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND), the start date of 
particular fiscal years for the IND, imposition of performance targets on the Home 
Office, adjustments of border controls or technologies, and statutory acts of 
oversight by parliamentary select committees and independent agencies. That 
preliminary exercise recorded >150 interventions [including over 100 statutory 
instruments that related to asylum between 1994 and 2004] for six dependent 
outputs. Because this study is restricted to <150 observations and each intervention 
has a conceivable effect upon ≥1 outputs, the likelihood of spurious correlations is 
considerable if all interventions were tested. Indeed, that probability is increased, 
since estimation of this series of models permits a lag of up to two months for the 
impact of each intervention. In order to counteract these complications it is 
imperative to select interventions cautiously, and with some scepticism, as a 
potential determinant of policy or bureaucratic outputs. That is to say, interventions 
must be selected with reference to causal theory, while conclusions must be 
qualified as indicating statistical significance because it remains possible for 
contemporaneous events to provide an alternative explanation of change in the 
dependent series. These were each tested as discrete interventions to produce 
provisional results, prior to the construction of a model incorporating multiple 
interventions.  
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Border control 
 
Since 1994, successive British Governments have sought to reduce the number of 
unfounded claims for asylum and – as a consequence – the level of asylum 
applications. The operation of border controls by government aimed, in particular, 
to pre-emptively inhibit false claims and counteract asylum shopping within the 
European Union.12 This integrated ‘push’ and ‘pull’ logics of control: (1) border 
facilities and protocols, (2) search capacity and technologies, (3) immigration 
offences and penalties, and (4) welfare entitlements open to asylum claimants. 
These are premised upon theories about the causes of migration flows – and known 
uses and abuses of the asylum system. For instance, the imposition of visa 
requirements for specific third countries is claimed to prevent unfounded 
applications for asylum at source, through restricting access to the British asylum 
system. Indeed, this is dependent upon the assessment of risk for the imposition of 
restrictions upon particular groups. Similarly, coordination of juxtaposed border 
controls with other European Economic Area (EEA) countries, at Channel ports and 
Eurostar terminals, is considered a restraint to onshore applications for asylum. But 
which specific interventions cause a significant change in the level of asylum 
applications?  
 
The reduced model, reported in Table 4, excludes interventions that relate to either 
political or public appointments, performance targets, budgetary expenditure and 
acts of oversight. There is no evidence that the tenure of particular individuals as 
Home Secretary, Permanent Secretary of the Home Office or Director-General of 
the IND had a significant impact upon the level of asylum applications. That is 
consistent with the conventions of collective responsibility of Cabinet Government 
and civil service impartiality. Similarly, the performance targets [‘Public Service 
Agreements’] set by HM Treasury’s Comprehensive Spending Review,13 in July 
1998, 2000 and 2002, did not cause an immediate change in the level of 
applications. That is unsurprising, since targets sought an improvement in 
departmental performance over a two-year period. In addition, consecutive 
increases of approximately 100% in budgetary expenditure of the IND for the fiscal 
years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 did not cause significant reductions in the level of 
applications for asylum. Nor did completion and publication of oversight 
investigations by Public Accounts, Home Affairs and Constitutional Affairs 
Committees, and National Audit Office. While that is in part attributable to the 
belated timing of these particular interventions, it is also consistent with the limited 
statutory powers of parliamentary and independent oversight under the Westminster 
system. This is, moreover, as should be expected for trends in asylum applications; 
since appointments, targets, budgetary expenditure and oversight in practice 
intercede adjustments in this output through other forms of legislative or 
bureaucratic action. The effects of such interventions are therefore unlikely to be 
captured by binary inputs. 
 
Instead, specific interventions in bureaucratic operation of border controls effected 
change in the level of applications for asylum. First, introduction of visa 
                                                 
12 The Dublin II Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 stipulates that applications for asylum must be processed in the 
country of entry (or alternatively in a country where the applicant has existing ties). 
13 Command Paper - Cm 4011. 14 July 1998. Modern public services for Britain: investing in reform. London: 
TSO. 
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requirements for Zimbabwean citizens [tabled in parliament as Statutory Instrument 
2002 No. 2758] in November 2002 is correlated with a reduction in applications at 
the 95% confidence level. This is plausible – at least – since 7,655 applicants 
arrived in Britain from Zimbabwe in 2002; although the size of intervention, at 
approximately 1,200, is greater than would be expected, so might have been 
sustained by subsequent interventions. It is conceivable that the introduction of 
‘non-suspensive appeals’ – under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act in 
November 2002 – might have also contributed to that reduction. These accelerated 
the decision and removal process, designating countries as ‘generally safe’ where 
an application could be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’. This intervention is, 
therefore, premised upon estimations of risk for specific populations as potential, 
unfounded claimants to inhibit or expedite applications. Second, contiguous to this, 
the coincidence of several events in December 2002 and January 2003 – the closure 
of the Red Cross reception centre at Sangatte, increase in the Carriers’ Liability 
penalty from £2,000 to £4,000, introduction of visa requirements for Jamaican 
citizens, installation of detection technologies at Calais, and restriction of welfare 
entitlements administered by the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) to 
claims submitted ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’ [interpreted as constituting a 
period of three days] – reflected a concerted effort by British Government to reduce 
the total number of applications for asylum. If measured as a single intervention, 
this group of interventions is correlated with a drop in applications, significant at 
the 90% confidence level. Again, the imposition of visa requirements was based 
upon estimation of the risk of unfounded applications presented by a specific 
population, while search and detection technologies were a perceived solution to the 
policing of clandestine entrants. 
 
This notwithstanding, ostensibly consequential events in border control proved 
insignificant as binary interventions [tested at the 90% confidence level]. For 
instance, this included the ‘Dublin Convention’, ‘Dublin II’, detection technologies 
installed at Coquelles, Vissingen, Ostend and Zeebrugge, juxtaposed immigration 
controls introduced at sea ports in Calais, Dunkirk, Boulogne and the Eurostar 
terminals in Paris, Lille, Calais and Brussels, introduction of the ‘civil penalty’ 
[carriers’ liability for transporting clandestine entrants into Britain] or other 
immigration-related offences, and the imposition of visa requirements for citizens 
of 22 different countries in June and October 2003.14 Nor is there evidence that 
earlier reforms of welfare entitlements for asylum claimants contributed to 
immediate downturns in the number of applications for asylum. These findings 
should, however, be tempered as indicating that interventions did not yield instant 
solutions, even if these did contribute to underlying trends in the level of 
applications; as captured by autoregressive [AR(1)] and integrated components 
[I(1)] in the estimated ARIMA model. Nonetheless, it is significant that the set of 
interventions that were correlated with changes in the level of policy outputs – 
without exception – corresponded to the manipulation of immigration controls, 
through forms of secondary legislation, bureaucratic facilities, technologies and 
procedures – with at least a partial reference to notions of risk.  
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Home Office. 15 October 2003. Tighter visa regimes to improve border control. Press Notice 280/2003.  
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Table 4. Effects of interventions on asylum applications 
 
Independent variable Yt
Parameter 
 
Date Asylum 
applications
I1 ωo1 11/2002 - 1242.31** 
(527.97) 
I2 ωo2 01/2003 - 603.87*  
(281.46)  
Noise Components and Diagnostics    
ARIMA   (1,1,0) 
Autoregressive (φ)    - 0.37*** 
(0.07) 
Moving Average (θ) at   - 
Mean (µ)   18.42 
(39.53) 
Sigma   551.45*** 
(30.33) 
Note: OLS regression coefficients, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests) with standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
Where: 
 
I1 is an intervention in November 2002 that captures the effect of visa requirements for 
Zimbabwean citizens plus the introduction of non-suspensive appeals 
 
I2 is an intervention in January 2003 that captures the effect of closure of the Red Cross 
reception centre at Sangatte, France, introduction of search technologies in Calais, and visa 
requirements for Jamaican citizens.  
 
 
Administration of the asylum system  
 
Beyond this focus of British governments upon operation of border controls 
throughout the period between 1994 and 2004, was a similar degree of legislative 
and executive attention to administrative parameters guiding the determination of 
claims for asylum and the enforcement of removals of failed claimants. This 
entailed logics of bureaucratic control that were directed toward (1) rates of 
processing [completion of decisions], (2) actual outcomes of decisions [grants, 
leave to remain, refusals], (3) the quality of decisions [appeals submitted, upheld, 
dismissed], and (4) enforcement [removals]. Because of the limited availability of 
monthly or quarterly official statistics on outstanding cases and appeals this 
analysis is confined to estimation of the effect of policy interventions on decisions, 
grants, leave to remain, refusals and removals. It is also important to note that the 
operational integrity of the asylum system remains dependent upon the quantity and 
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quality of inputs [applications], just as control of the level of applications for 
asylum is subject to complex, exogenous forces.  
 
Nonetheless, this was premised upon a hierarchical conception of the control of 
bureaucratic outputs, with prescribed administrative tasks designated to the 
specialized divisions of the IND; the Asylum Casework Directorate [decisions] and 
Immigration Service [removals].15 The legislative and executive interventions of 
British Government sought to direct and prioritize activities of bureaucrats in the 
IND, as well as to modify the rules relating to applications for asylum. Which 
particular interventions caused significant adjustments in determinations of claims 
for asylum and enforcement of removals of failed applicants? What are the 
principal determinants of the administrative performance of the IND in its 
execution of the government’s policy on the right to asylum?  
 
Similar to results for the level of asylum applications, the reduced models reported 
in Table 5 exclude interventions that relate to appointments, performance targets, 
budgetary expenditure and acts of oversight. The tenure of named individuals as the 
Home Secretary, Permanent Secretary of the Home Office and Director-General of 
the IND were each found to have an insignificant impact upon the level of the sub-
categories of decisions and removals, if estimated as a step transfer function. Nor 
did election of the Blair Government in May 1997 stimulate an immediate response 
in the level of bureaucratic activities related to the determination of applications for 
asylum. As a result, there is no evidence of agency ‘autopilot’, given absence of a 
direct, equilibrating response in performance of the IND to the turnover of its 
elected and unelected principals. Once again, this is consistent with defining tenets 
of the Westminster system – the collective responsibility of Cabinet and 
impartiality of the British civil service. For this configuration of principal-agent 
relations, it is perhaps improbable that interventions would consist of this abrupt, 
binary form. It remains conceivable, of course, that tacit forms of political control 
of bureaucratic outputs were circumscribed by international treaties or concordats 
governing the treatment of asylum seekers.  
 
That conjecture notwithstanding, more direct forms of political control were also 
discovered to have an insignificant impact as binary interventions upon the 
activities of the IND. Public Service Agreements imposed under the 
Comprehensive Spending Review in July 1998, 2000 and 2002 did not cause an 
adjustment in levels of decisions, grants, leave to remain, refusals or removals. 
Where the activation date of service agreements in January 1999, 2001 and 2003 is 
instead used as the date of intervention, the second round of targets is discovered to 
correspond to a significant escalation in the processing activities of the IND. 
However, it is doubtful that this elicited a direct response in the level of outputs, 
since it also coincided with its abandonment of the Casework Programme – a failed 
£100m Private Finance Initiative IT project launched in 1996, that had distracted 
and destabilized the casework operations of the IND – and a peak in the number of 
caseworkers processing applications, at 769, in February 2001. Nor is there 
substantive evidence that increases in the budget of the IND, for the fiscal years 
commencing April 1999 and 2000, or the publication of investigations into 
operation of border controls and administration of the asylum system by Public 
                                                 
15 The IND also has fixed rate contracts with private firms for the in-country and overseas movement and escort 
of detained immigration offenders.   
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Accounts, Home Affairs and Constitutional Affairs Committees, and National 
Audit Office, impacted directly upon levels of bureaucratic activity. In 
chronological order, results are now presented for interventions that caused a 
significant adjustment in one or more of the dependent outputs.  
 
Intervention 1. In December 1998, as part of the fallout from the problems with the 
Casework Programme, there was disruption to processing activities at IND 
headquarters due to reorganization of casework activities into the Integrated 
Casework Directorate (ICD), with a streamlined system of team-based casework. 
The resumption of normal activities at the end of this transitional period, in April 
1999, is found to be correlated to a significant increase in the number of grants of 
asylum. It is unclear why there are no similar effects for other categories. While this 
intervention transpired at the same time as publication of the National Audit Office 
report into failure of the Casework Programme and an increase of over 100% in the 
budget assigned to the IND for the fiscal year, it is unlikely that these impacted 
directly upon the level of grants. In particular, the deployment of extra caseworkers 
supported by this funding would have been lagged by requirements of recruitment 
and training.   
 
Interventions 2, 3 and 4. In the months after the Immigration and Asylum Act of 
December 1999, there are a cluster of significant increases in the processing 
activities of the IND. These are attributable as a response of the IND to the 
legislation itself and installation of additional fast-track capabilities in the asylum 
system for the determination of claims. However, there is countervailing evidence 
of bureaucratic autopilot, since this consisted of underlying increases in 
authorizations of leave to remain under ‘backlog criteria’16 and refusals on grounds 
of technical non-compliance,17 with no public record of corresponding amendments 
of the rules and directives under which decisions were made. That is either in the 
formal provisions of the legislation or instructions from elected or unelected 
principals. While the opening of a fast-track detention centre at Oakington 
accelerated the process of refusals for ‘safe third countries’ where claims were 
certified as ‘manifestly unfounded’ by the Home Secretary, it remains implausible 
that this contributed to more than a fraction of this increase in refusals. That is 
given both the size of increase and the holding capacity of Oakington.18 Similarly, it 
is unlikely that coincidental publication of the report of the Public Accounts 
Committee stimulated the direct response of those bureaucratic outputs in question. 
 
Interventions 5 and 6. The introduction of formal regulations for the ‘one-stop 
procedure’ of appeals by statutory instrument in October 2000, subject to the 
provisions of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, is significantly correlated 
with increases in the levels of decisions, leave to remain and refusals (at a lag of 
one or two months). The procedure required applicants to submit a statement of 
                                                 
16 These were reported in the official statistics as ‘cases decided under pragmatic measures aimed at reducing 
the pre ’96 asylum backlog’. 
17 Under Paragraph 340 of the Immigration Rules, non-compliance constitutes ‘[a] failure, without reasonable 
explanation, to make a prompt and full disclosure of material facts, either orally or in writing, or otherwise to 
assist the Secretary of State in establishing the facts of the case may lead to refusal of an asylum application or 
a human rights claim’. In practice, this includes the failure to attend an interview or report to be fingerprinted 
and failure to return or late return of the self-completion Statement of Evidence (SEF) or other questionnaires. 
18 This aimed to make an initial decision within 7 to 10 days. In 2002, a decision was made on 7,775 applicants 
held at Oakington. Of these, 99% were refused. 
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additional grounds for wishing to enter or remain in Britain as early as possible in 
the course of their application. This streamlined and accelerated processing of 
claims by the IND, requiring information relevant to each case to be considered as 
part of an initial decision. It is therefore noticeable that the level of grants was 
insulated from effects of the one-stop procedure, in contrast to the response of the 
other categories. 
 
Interventions 7 and 8. In February and March 2001, there were increases – 
significant at the 99% confidence level – in the number of cases decided by the IND 
[decisions, grants, leave to remain and refusals]. This coincided with its 
abandonment of the beleaguered Casework Programme, which had distracted 
casework operations since its inception in April 1996. The IND had, though, 
processed applications using the Case Information Database (CID) added to manual 
procedures from April 2000. Because of this, it is not clear that cancellation of the 
project was a direct cause of this upturn in bureaucratic activities. Similarly, it is 
implausible that a high in numbers of caseworkers deployed on applications caused 
more than a fraction of this increase in decisions, since the growth in bureaucratic 
personnel was incremental. The inference might, instead, be that – through a form 
of autopilot – this emblematic refocusing of casework operations within the IND 
stimulated the increase in the level of the dependent outputs. Indeed, it remains 
conceivable that the irreversible sinking of this imagined solution to backlogs that 
had afflicted the IND throughout the 1990s was the cause of the response of rates of 
processing; rather than the activation of performance targets under the second round 
of Public Service Agreements or publication of the report of the Home Affairs 
Committee investigation into border controls [each in January 2001]. 
 
Intervention 9. On 1 April 2003, the Home Office abolished the category of 
‘extraordinary leave to remain’ and replaced it with categories of ‘humanitarian 
protection’ and ‘discretionary leave’. This change in bureaucratic criteria is 
correlated at the 99% confidence level with a reduction in the level of this re-
constituted classification of short-term protection. The launch of operations of the 
Eurodac fingerprint database in January 2003, pursuant to provisions of an earlier 
directive of the Council of the EU, is contemporaneous to this intervention. 
Because there were no corresponding adjustments in the other dependent outputs – 
such as grants or refusals – it is unlikely that Eurodac precipitated this drop in the 
number of authorizations of short-term protection. 
 
Interventions 10 and 11. The implementation of waves 2 and 3 of ‘non-suspensive 
appeals’ in April and July 2003, via statutory instruments subject to the provisions 
of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, is correlated at the 95% 
confidence level with an increase in the level of removals. This procedure of non-
suspensive appeals permits applications to be certified by the Home Secretary as 
‘clearly unfounded’, for [designated] safe third countries where the applicant is 
considered ‘at no serious risk of persecution’. It therefore removes the in-country 
right of appeal. While this coincided with introduction of fast-track procedures at 
Harmondsworth and publication of a final report of the Home Affairs Select 
Committee investigation into asylum removals, congruence in the impact of these 
equivalent, discrete interventions suggests that non-suspensive appeals were the 
principal cause of the escalation in bureaucratic enforcement of removals. It is 
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noticeable that these interventions represent the exception in pertaining to ‘risk’ as 
an organizing concept for the administration of asylum.  
 
Similar to the findings for border control, a number of adjustments in 
administration of the asylum system that are considered of note in fact proved 
insignificant as binary interventions, as tested at the 90% confidence level. For 
instance, this included the Dublin I and Dublin II conventions, introduction and 
abolition of the accelerated appeals procedure for the designated ‘white list’ of third 
countries – where there was ‘… in general, no serious risk of persecution’, the 
lifting of a ban on returns of failed applicants to Zimbabwe, opening of specific 
detention or removal centres (plus disruption to holding and processing facilities 
caused by disturbances at particular sites), and end of removals to accession 
countries after expansion of the European Union in 2004. In practice, the likelihood 
is that many of these interventions had gradual or residual effects that were not 
captured by the specification of time series impact models with step transfer 
functions. Because of the autoregressive and stochastic nature of the dependent 
outputs, it is sometimes difficult to extract the precise, immediate degree of their 
importance.   
 
Discussion 
 
The British public appears to notice, and respond to, actual bureaucratic and policy 
outputs related to the government’s control and administration of asylum, but not 
the level of immigration. Because the measure of public opinion that is used in this 
analysis indicates the importance of the issue of asylum and immigration, relative to 
other issues, it is conceivable that its underlying preference for ‘more’ or ‘less’ is 
quite stable. This might also be the case for public perception of risk. If that is so, 
adjustments in public opinion reveal change in the intensity of preferences. In either 
case, the responsiveness of the public thermostat reflects an attentiveness to the 
performance of the British Government. This evidence implies that the median 
point in the aggregate distribution of public attitudes adjusts in response to actual 
bureaucratic and policy outputs. Of course, it is known that the mass media exerts a 
significant agenda-setting influence (see Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Zaller 1992; 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993) and moderates public opinion. There is evidence of 
determination of public attitudes about immigration and asylum by media exposure 
(Duffy and Rowden 2005). However, it remains notable that the public is sensitive 
in a meaningful way to real changes in border control and the administration of 
asylum. While it might be issue importance – and not the relative preference for 
more or less – that is responsive to change in bureaucratic and policy outputs, it 
remains significant that this adopted measure of public opinion is systematic and 
consistent in its behaviour, regardless of the accuracy or balance of media reporting. 
 
In return, individual bureaucratic and policy outputs for the asylum system are 
responsive to changes in public opinion. The levels of applications, decisions, leave 
to remain, refusals and removals seem responsive to changes in issue importance. 
There is no equivalent adjustment in the levels of grants of asylum or other forms of 
immigration in response to the identical changes in issue importance. These 
findings reveal that dynamics of public responsiveness and policy responsiveness 
are symmetrical in differences between asylum and immigration. In other words, 
unresponsiveness of public opinion to the level of immigration is matched by corre- 
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Table 5. Effects of interventions on asylum administration 
 
YtIndependent 
variable 
Parameter Date Asylum 
   Decisions Grants Leave to 
remain 
Refusals Removals19
I1 ωo1 04/1999 - 565.69*** 
 (162.24) 
- - - 
I2 ωo2 01/2000 3381.32*** 
(654.12) 
- - 2360.05*** 
(599.88) 
- 
I3 ωo3 02/2000 - 359.80** 
(150.71) 
- - - 
I4 ωo4 03/2000 4569.41*** 
(914.08) 
- 1056.26*** 
(216.89) 
2382.91*** 
(423.35) 
- 
I5
 
ωo5 11/2000 4404.58** 
(816.47) 
- - 2526.28*** 
 (634.74) 
- 
I6 ωo6 12/2000 - - 701.02*** 
 (129.16) 
- - 
I7
 
ωo7 02/2001 2945.81*** 
(990.54) 
- 1203.11*** 
(145.61) 
2524.94*** 
(763.74) 
- 
I8 ωo8 03/2001  1075.91*** 
 (145.13) 
   
I9 ωo9 03/2003 - - -727.92*** 
 (201.77) 
- - 
I10 ωo10 04/2003 - - - - 150.70** 
(60.14) 
I11 ωo11 07/2003 - - - - 133.54** 
 (51.46) 
Noise components and diagnostics      
ARIMA 
(p,d,q) 
  (1,1,0) (1,1,1) (1,1,0) (1,1,0) (2,1,0) 
Autoregressive 
(φ) 
  - 0.54***   
(0.03) 
- 0.51*** 
 (0.13) 
- 0.56*** 
 (0.03) 
- 0.49*** 
 (0.03) 
L1 -
0.58*** 
(0.07) 
L2 -
0.32*** 
(0.09) 
Moving 
Average (θ) 
  - 0.84*** 
(0.11) 
-  - 
Mean (µ)   - 110.99 
(89.87) 
- 15.18 
(32.19) 
- 16.81 
 (15.80) 
- 69.24 
(79.62) 
5.39 
(4.13) 
Sigma   1198.58*** 
(43.62) 
261.54*** 
(11.27) 
246.47*** 
 (10.45) 
927.65*** 
(34.68) 
75.33*** 
 (5.55) 
Note: OLS regression coefficients, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests) with standard 
errors in parentheses.  
                                                 
19 The removals category does not include the ‘voluntary assisted returns program’ (VARP) started in February 
1999, so underestimates the outputs of the system. 
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Where: 
 
I1 is an intervention in April 1999 that captures the effect of completion of transition of 
organization of the IND to Integrated Caseworking and start of fiscal year 1999-2000. 
 
I2 is an intervention in January 2000 that captures the effect of the Immigration and Asylum 
Act 1999 and a surge in the number of authorizations of leave to remain under ‘backlog 
criteria’ and refusals on the grounds of technical non-compliance, and I3 and I4 are 
interventions in March 2000 and April 2000 that also captures the effect of that surge. 
 
I5 and I6 are interventions in November 2000 and December 2000 that capture the effect of 
introduction of the “one stop procedure” for an accelerated decision process,  
 
I7 and I8 are interventions in February 2001 and March 2001 that capture the effect of 
abandonment of the “Casework Programme” by the Home Office and Siemens, opting 
instead for use of the Case Information Database database.  
 
I9 is an intervention in March 2003 that captures the effect of abolition of the category of 
‘Extraordinary leave to remain’ and its replacement with ‘Humanitarian protection’ and 
‘Discretionary leave’.  
 
I10 and I11 are interventions in April 2003 and July 2003 that capture the effect of 
introduction of non-suspensive appeals wave 2 (Albania, Bulgaria, Jamaica, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Romania and Serbia/Montenegro) and wave 3 (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Ecuador, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Ukraine).  
 
 
sponding unresponsiveness of policymakers to changes in public opinion. The 
evidence on the relationship between policy and public opinion is consistent with 
the conceptualization of a thermostatic system (Wlezien 1995, 1996, 2004), 
whereas the interrupted nature of policy interventions is nearer to models of 
punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1993; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). Those interventions that impacted upon the total number of 
decisions were dependent upon underlying changes in the levels of leave to remain 
and refusals. In the British Government’s operation of border controls, each of the 
significant policy interventions was – in part – premised upon the concept of risk 
and directed towards its mitigation. The administration of applications for asylum 
was, instead, reliant upon technological and bureaucratic solutions. These findings 
could be an artefact of the use of binary, ‘step’ inputs to model the effects of 
interventions. It remains quite noticeable that risk and responsiveness co-existed in 
this particular sphere of political and administrative action. 
 
In testimony to the Home Affairs Select Committee on 23 May 2006, the recently 
appointed Home Secretary, John Reid, described the asylum system as being ‘not 
fit for purpose’, and ‘… in a state of transition from a paper-based system that was 
not designed for the problems we are facing, towards a technologically-based 
system that seems to be on an horizon that never gets any nearer’.20 Evidence from 
the estimation of time series intervention models suggests that, throughout the past 
decade, the British Government nevertheless calibrated designated activities of the 
Immigration and Nationality Directorate via a succession of strategic interventions. 
                                                 
20 Rt. Hon. John Reid, Home Secretary, Oral evidence, Home Affairs Committee, 23 May 2006 [HC 775-ix]. 
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A few of these related to ‘risk’ as an organizing concept, but most were configured 
through the mobilization of bureaucratic capabilities. The political control of 
bureaucratic and policy outputs was secured through the legal or technical 
adjustments of administrative rules, procedures and technologies, in addition to the 
perceptible autopilot responses of caseworkers. These included the reorganization 
of bureaucratic activities (e.g. integrated casework), accelerated/streamlined 
processes (e.g. the one-stop procedure, non-suspensive appeals), revision of 
administrative criteria (e.g. the abolition of ‘extraordinary leave to remain’) and 
unprompted – if the public record is to be believed – modification of the number of 
cases determined under discretionary criteria (e.g. increases in leave to remain 
decided under backlog criteria and refusals on grounds of non-compliance). Indeed, 
a temporary retreat to paper-based methods in the aftermath of the debacle of the 
Casework Programme is correlated with direct improvements in bureaucratic 
performance.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The preceding empirical evidence suggests that – at the aggregate level – the British 
public notice and respond to change in different outputs linked to asylum policy, 
but not other forms of immigration. In response, government is inclined to adjust 
the corresponding bureaucratic and policy outputs in order to ease public anxiety 
and concern. It monitors and controls the number of entrants to the asylum system, 
accelerates the rate of casework of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate, 
adjusts the number of rulings of leave to remain or refusals, and modifies its 
enforcement of removal of failed applicants. The level of bureaucratic and policy 
outputs functions as a valve that releases the pressure exerted by public opinion. 
This consists of strategic interventions by the British Government – in the form of 
legislative or technical adjustments of administrative rules, procedures and 
technologies – to control the designated activities of bureaucrats. These were often 
enabled by the specific provisions of preceding acts of parliament. At the same 
time, there were perceptible autopilot responses in the activities of caseworkers, 
which appear to have been independent of interventions of government. The 
evidence implies existence of a confounding ‘wisdom of crowds’ for this politicized 
and controversial issue, since it reveals that public opinion responds with surprising 
precision to the actual performance of the asylum system. The absence of 
responsiveness of immigration is symmetrical with the public’s insensitivity to 
changes in actual policy outputs. It is not possible, in either instance, to discount the 
possibility that changes in issue importance do not correspond to changes in the 
public’s preference for more or less asylum claimants or immigrants. This itself is 
an important qualifier, since it suggests that issue importance might sometimes be 
thermostatic. In return, the responsiveness of the British Government is dependent 
upon its control of the bureaucracy, for securing change in bureaucratic and policy 
outputs. The government’s achievement of an effective, and proportionate, response 
to public opinion is dependent upon a complex system of administrative rules, 
technologies and agencies. This reveals an ambiguous relationship between risk and 
responsiveness – but also the dependence upon logics and technologies of control 
that illustrates the modern state’s disposition towards monitoring and measurement 
(Scott 1998). In light of all this, it is remarkable that actual policy outputs were as 
sensitive as they were to public opinion.  
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